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TRIAL CONSULTING: JURORS' AND ATTORNEYS'
PERCEPTIONS OF MURDER
RIcHARD L. WIENER*
DENNIS P. STOLLE**
This paper compares the results of a juror survey in a murder case to
predictions of juror behavior made by public defenders experienced in mur-
der trials. Respondents selected from the St. Louis City Circuit Court venire
pool were given a summary of the facts in a first degree murder case, a jury
verdict and sentence questionnaire, and an attitude and demographic ques-
tionnaire. Data analyses isolated correlates of verdict (guilty vs. not
guilty), sentence (death vs. life imprisonment), and juror certainty. The
Missouri Public Defender's Office used the results to assist in peremptory
challenges in a murder trial. Although our analyses of the attorneys' pre-
dictions ofjuror responses identified more correlates ofjuror decisions than
we found in the juror data, our results also indicated that the attorneys
overlooked several discriminating factors. The usefulness of social science
for trial preparation is discussed in light of thesefindings.
Trial attorneys are acutely attuned to the nuances of human behavior,
which enables them to detect the minutest traces of bias or inability to
reach an appropriate decision.'
Self-made men of the assertive type are to be shunned. Their attitude is
always one of contempt for the defendant. They compare their status with
his. They have not sympathy for him. He is a victim of his own weakness.
The self-made man will send your client to the gallows or the chair with-
out compunction.2
* Saint Louis University. All correspondence concerning this manuscript should be
sent to the first author at Department of Psychology, 221 N. Grand Blvd., Saint Louis Uni-
versity, St. Louis, MO 63103. E-mail: WIENERRL@SLUVCA.SLU.EDU.
** University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
1. R. Begam, Voir Dire: The Attorney's Job, 13 TRIAL 3 (1977), quoted in LAWRENCE S.
WRIGHTSMAN, PsYcHoLoGY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 234 (2d ed. 1991).
2. Samuel S. Leibowitz, quoted in M. GILBERT, THE OXFORD BOOK OF LEGAL AN-
ECDOTES 199 (3rd ed. 1987).
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Commentators sometimes cite the first quote as anecdotal evidence of
attorneys' perceptions of self-efficacy for juror selection? Although there
are no law school courses that teach skills of successful voir dire, there exist
in abundance folk formulas that lawyers use to guide juror selection.4 In
fact, there are a number of published books' and journal articles6 that make
predictions about juror behavior. Yet, a careful examination demonstrates
inconsistencies in the substance of the folk formulas.7 Further, empirical
investigations have challenged the relationship between judgment confi-
dence and judgment accuracy among lay persons and professionals in legal8
and extra-legal settings?
As the second quote suggests, litigators may overestimate the diagnos-
ticity of juror characteristics and overestimate the strength of relationships
between juror attributes and verdicts. Once such a link is identified
(perhaps wrongly), it is easy to develop a cognitive justification10 that in-
oculates the belief against disconfirming data." The idiosyncratic nature of
attorney intuition is demonstrated by the conflicting advice available to trial
lawyers. Consider for example the issue of juror gender. While Darrow"
recommends against female jurors in all cases, Heyl'3 suggests that female
jurors will be favorable to male plaintiffs. Moreover, Wagner 4 offers a
complicated set of tests to use when evaluating juror gender.
Armed with their knowledge of attorney uncertainty and the results of
3. See Brian L. Cutler, Introduction: The Status of Scientific Jury Selection in Psychol-
ogy and Law, 3 FORENSIc REP. 227 (1990). See also Soloman M. Fulero & Steven D. Pen-
rod, The Myths and Realities of Attorney Jury Selection Folklore and Scientific Jury Selec-
tion: What Works?, 17 Omo N.U. L. Rev. 229 (1990); LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN,
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1991).
4. For a full discussion, see Fulero & Penrod, supra note 3.
5. See, e.g., FRED LANE, LANE'S GOLDSTEIN TRIAL TECHNIQUE (3d ed. 1984); W.
WAGNER, ART OF ADVOCACY: JURY SELECrION (1988); W. JORDAN, JURY SELECTION (1980).
6. See, e.g., R. E. Cartwright, Jury Selection, 13 TRIAL 29 (1977); B.E. Davis & R.E.
Wiley, Forty-Nine Thoughts on Jury Selection, 34 D.C. B. J. 15 (1967); S.K. Jacobs, Jury
Selection Tips, CAL. TRIAL L. Ass'N F., Dec. 1983, at 344.
7. See Fulero & Penrod, supra note 3; WRIGHTsMAN, supra note 2; Valerie Hans, Jury
Decision Making, in HANDBOOK OFPSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 56 (D.K. Kagehiro & W.S. Laufer
eds. 1992).
8. See Gary L. Wells & Donna M. Murray, What Can Psychology Say About the Neil v.
Biggers Criteria for Judging Eyewitness Accuracy?, 68 J. APPLED PSYCHOL. 347 (1983).
9. See Stuart Oskamp, Overconfidence in Case-Study Judgments, 29 J. CONSULTING
PSYCHOL. 261 (1965); J. FRANK YATES, JUDGMENTAND DECISIONMAIUNG (1990).
10. See Leibowitz, supra note 2.
11. See J. Klayman & Y.W. Ha, Confirmation, Disconfirmation, and Information in Hy-
pothesis Testing, 94 PSYCHOL. REv. 211 (1987); R.B. Skov & S.J. Sherman, Information-
Gathering Processes: Diagnosticity Hypothesis-Confirmatory Strategies, and Perceived Hy-
pothesis Confirmation, 22 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 93 (1986).
12. See Fulero & Penrod, supra note 3, at 232 (citing Darrow, Attorney for the Defense,
8 EsQuiRE35 (1936)).
13. See Fulero & Penrod, supra note 3, at 232 (citing Heyl, Selection of the Jury, 40 ILL.
BJ. 328, 340 (1952)).
14. See WAGNER, supra note 5.
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juror surveys, social scientists have developed a thriving business assisting
trial attorneys with case preparation.' In this paper we discuss the value of
juror surveys as supplements to the knowledge that trial lawyers bring to
voir dire. We designed an empirical investigation to measure the impor-
tance of the information surveys offer in light of trial attorneys' knowledge
about the relationship between juror characteristics and likely case decisions
(i.e., predeliberation verdicts). We approach the topic of scientific jury se-
lection 6 by comparing the results of a juror survey to attorneys' implicit be-
liefs about juror behavior.
The literature contains lengthy discussions of the fit of social science
research'7 with the strategic goals of litigation as well as with the legal re-
quirements of challenges for cause 8 and peremptory challenges 9 in voir
dire. Debates about the ethical issues associated with scientific jury selec-
tion are also published.20 Among the positions offered are the conclusions
that scientific jury selection is a moderately successful methodology capable
of assisting attorneys in zealously advocating for their clients and that his
amounts to an unethical advantage for the rich which undermines the inter-
ests of poorer litigants, and it is an ineffective trespass by social scientists
into a system of proven effectiveness. As a result of this debate, the effec-
tiveness of the juror survey as a tool for voir dire has become the topic of
growing discussion and empirical research.
Early research examining the associations between juror characteristics
and verdict tendencies found evidence of only weak to moderately sized re-
lationships.2' However, more recent studies report that juror characteristics
15. See Cutler, supra note 3; Hans, supra note 7.
16. See, e.g., Cutler, supra note 3; Hans supra note 7; . Schulman et al., Recipe for a
Jury, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, May 1973, at 37-44, 77-84.
17. See JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS (1990); WRIG'IsMAN, supra note 3.
18. Challenges for cause are strikes that attorneys make in the voir dire process in order
to remove venire people who have demonstrated by their answers that they will not be able to
be impartial evaluators of the facts in the case. See MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 17.
The attorneys must convince the judge that they have a reasonable case for bias before the
court will dismiss ajuror for cause.
19. Peremptory challenges allow the attorneys to exclude a venire person from serving
on a jury with no stated reason and without permission from the judge. See Swain v. Ala-
bama, 380 U.S, 202 (1965). Each side has a certain number of peremptory challenges that it
may use to strike prospective jurors without explaining the logic to the court so long as they
do not strike venire people for discriminatory reasons such as race. See Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79 (1986). It is largely through the use of peremptory challenges that attorneys at-
tempt to select jurors that are most likely to be sympathetic to their arguments.
20. See Michael J. Saks, The Limits of Scientific Jury Selection, 17 JUMEnRIuCS J. 3
(1976); R. Christie, Probability v. Precedence: The Social Psychology of Jury Selection, in
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW: RESEARCH FRoNmRs 157 (G. Bermant et al. eds., 1976); A. Etzi-
oni, Creating an Imbalance, 10 TRIAL 28 (1974); Dennis P. Stolle et al., The Perceived Fair-
ness of the Psychologist Trial Consultant: An Empirical Investigation, 20 L. & PSYCHOL.
REv. 139 (1996).
21. See Cutler, supra note 3. See also Fulero & Penrod, supra note 3; Hans, supra note
7; Valerie Hans & Neil Vidmar, Jury Selection, in N. KERR & R. BRAY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
19971
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account for small but meaningful percentages of variance (4% to 31%) in
criminal verdicts. ' Further, as Penrod and Cutler point out, prediction for-
mulas that explain as little as 5% of the variance in verdicts could have an
appreciable impact on attorney success during voir dire. While there has
been much less research examining the effectiveness of juror surveys in
predicting outcomes in civil cases, one study conducted by Goodman,
Loftus, and Greene suggests that juror attitudes rather than juror demo-
graphic characteristics may be the best predictors of damage awards.'
Studies of civil and criminal cases favor juror attitudes over demographic
factors. However, these same studies qualify those conclusions by ac-
knowledging that the types of juror attitudes that predict juror behavior may
vary extensively across cases.
Similarly, studies of attorneys' intuitions about juror behavior indicate
that attorney beliefs also vary from case to case. While Hayden, Senna, and
Siegel found attorneys to be most interested in juror age, occupation, de-
meanor, gender, appearance, and residence when asked to select information
they found valuable in voir dire,' Penrod found attorneys' judgments of
similarities among jurors were based on attitudes toward legal technicalities,
gender, ideological orientation, and age.26 In another study, Tate, Hawrish,
and Clark found no evidence that juror characteristics directly influenced
attorneys' ratings of juror acceptability.v Finally, in a study of venire peo-
ple whom attorneys selected or rejected, Padawer-Singer, Singer, and Singer
found the samples to be substantially similar on a series of attitude ques-
tions, suggesting that the trial lawyers were unable to distinguish among the
venire people.' In summary, it appears that attorney intuition, like empiri-
THE COURTROOM 39 (1982).
22. See C.L. Cowan et al., The Effects of Death Qualification Jurors' Predisposition to
Convict on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 53 (1984); REID HASTIM Er AL.,
INSIDE THE JURY (1983); L Hepburn, The Objective Reality of Evidence and the Utility of
Systematic Jury Selection, 4 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 89 (1980); Gary Moran & John C. Comfort,
Neither "Tentative" nor "Fragmentary": Verdict Preference of Impaneled Felony Jurors as
a Function of Attitude Toward Capital Punishment, 71 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 146 (1986);
Gary Moran et al., Jury Selection in Major Controlled Substance Trials: The Need for Ex-
tended Voir Dire, 3 FORENSIC REP. 331 (1990); Steven D. Penrod, Predictors of Jury Deci-
sion Making in Criminal and Civil Cases: A Field Experiment, 3 FORENSIC REP. 261 (1990);
C. Visher, Juror Decision Making: The Importance of Evidence, 11 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 1
(1987).
23. See Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Assessing the Competence of Juries, in I. WEINER
& A. HESS, HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 293 (1985).
24. See J. Goodman et al., Matters of Money: Voir Dire in Civil Cases, 3 FORENSIC REP.
303 (1990).
25. See G. Hayden et al., Prosecutorial Discretion in Peremptory Challenges: An Em-
pirical Investigation of Information Use in the Massachusetts Jury Selection Process, 13 NExv
ENG. L. REv. 768 (1978).
26. See Fulero & Penrod, supra note 3, at 241.
27. See E. Tate et al., Communication Variables in Jury Selection, 24 J. COMM. 130
(1974).
28. See A. Padawer-Singer et al., Voir Dire by Two Lawyers: An Essential Safeguard, 57
[(Vol. 34
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cal relationships between juror characteristics and verdict outcomes, varies
broadly from fact pattern to fact pattern.
Our research was conducted to gather information to help answer three
general questions about jury surveys and attorney beliefs about juror be-
havior: (1) In a specific capital murder case, can we identify demographic
and attitudinal factors that correlate with juror verdict, sentence, and cer-
tainty?; (2) In the same case, can we identify specific demographic and at-
titudinal factors which attorneys believe to be predictive of verdict and sen-
tence outcomes?; and (3) Are the factors identified in the attorneys' intuitive
knowledge consistent with the empirical correlates of juror behavior?
We expected that the answers to these questions would provide an in-
teresting and unusual perspective on the usefulness of scientific jury selec-
tion. We reasoned that while total or near total agreement between the two
approaches would suggest that juror surveys are largely redundant and
without much usefulness to litigators, significant areas of disagreement
would attest to the potential value of juror surveys in increasing attorneys'
abilities to predict during voir dire juror behavior at sentencing. We con-
ducted two separate studies to examine these possibilities. In the first study,
we presented the facts of a murder case along with verdict, attitude, and
demographic questionnaires to ninety-six venire people. In the second
study, we presented similar materials to a sample of eighteen public defend-
ers and asked them to predict the responses of a sample of typical jurors.
STUDY 1
METHOD
Participants
Participants were ninety-six volunteers (paid five dollars each) from the
venire panel at the St. Louis Circuit Court. Participants were individuals
who were not selected to serve on a jury. Data from fourteen respondents
were discarded because those people were unwilling to impose the death
penalty and were therefore ineligible to serve on Missouri first degree mur-
der cases.' Of the remaining eighty-two respondents, the average age was
forty-three years old. Twenty-nine (35%) were men and fifty-three (65%)
were women. Twenty-nine (35%) were African-American, while fifty-one
(64%) were white and one (1%) indicated race as "other." Forty partici-
pants (49%) were married and forty-two (51%) were single, divorced, or
widowed. All participants except two reported finishing high school, and
many (24 or 29%) had at least attended some college classes.
JuDicATuRE 386 (1974).
29. See generally Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986); Wainwright v. Witt, 469
U.S. 412 (1985); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (holding that removal for
cause of jurors who are unwilling to impose death penalty is constitutional).
1997]
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Materials
Each participant received a case summary and a follow-up question-
naire with sections that measured verdicts, sentences, demographics, general
attitudes, and death imposition beliefs. The questionnaire items were drawn
primarily from the Missouri Public Defenders' venire survey? We relied
heavily on questions which public defenders commonly use to select jurors
in order to maximize the usefulness of our results for applied settings. We
added several items to the survey that mock jury researchers have found
useful in predicting juror behavior, but that were not found in the original
public defender survey. There are no available data that describe the psy-
chometric properties of the instrument because the survey consisted of a
modified version of an applied tool constructed by the public defenders' of-
fice. However, two capital murder litigators reviewed the final form and
agreed that it consisted of items commonly asked during voir dire. Moreo-
ver, they agreed that answers to the questions would be useful in selecting a
jury from a venire panel.
Case Summary: The State v. Evans3 case summary provided the facts
in a first degree murder case. Defendant Charles Evans was a drug dealer
who argued with another dealer, Sam Green, while trying to sell drugs in
Green's neighborhood. Later in the day, Evans returned to Green's neigh-
borhood with a loaded gun. A gun battle ensued during which Green
grabbed a neighborhood child. Evans fired at Green but missed and shot the
child. The child later died. At issue in the case was whether Evans fired
with the purpose of killing Green, or whether he fired in self-defense.
Case Fact Questionnaire: The case fact questionnaire included twenty-
one true/false statements of correct and incorrect case facts. Five of these
items were comprehension checks used to test whether the respondents un-
derstood the case. The other items, not reported on, were used to assist the
public defenders office to prepare for the Jones trial."
Verdict Questionnaire: The verdict questionnaire presented definitions
of first and second degree murder in accordance with Missouri Approved
Jury Instructions.3 Participants supplied guilty and not guilty verdicts as
well as certainty ratings (1 = very uncertain to 5 = very certain). Partici-
pants who found the defendant guilty of first degree murder provided sen-
tences (death or life imprisonment) and a certainty rating for the sentence.
Demographic Questionnaire: Respondents completed a demographic
questionnaire (31 items) which included questions about themselves, their
families, their habits, and their experience with the legal system. All ques-
30. Missouri Public Defenders' Venire Survey (on file with author).
31. The case summary was modeled after the facts in a then active case, State v. Jones,
919 S.W.2d 12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). The names and locations in the case were changed to
disguise the identity of the actual case.
32. See id.
33. MiSSOuRI APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS (West 1981).
230 [Vol. 34
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tions were written in forced choice format with most requiring a yes or no
response.
Attitude Questionnaire: Participants evaluated fourteen attitude items
providing answers ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
The attitude questions pertained to the criminal justice system (e.g., Crimi-
nal punishments scare potential criminals so that they do not commit future
crimes; Handguns should be controlled by federal laws).
Attitude toward the death penalty: The last page of the survey asked
participants, "under any circumstance would you ever consider imposing the
death penalty in any case?" If the participant answered no, his or her data
were dropped from further analysis.
Procedure
Each participant received a packet containing the State v. Evans case
summary followed by the five survey components. The participants were
asked to read the case summary and to answer the questionnaires that fol-
lowed.
Results
Reported below are findings for the verdict, sentencing, attitudes, and
demographic sections of the questionnaire.'
Comprehension Check: The correct response rate for the factual com-
prehension checks ranged from 83 to 99% (M = 90%), indicating that the
venire participants paid close attention to the case facts and understood the
summary.
Verdict: Of the eighty-one respondents who were death eligible jurors
and who supplied a verdict, eighteen (22%) found Evans not guilty of first
degree murder and sixty-three (78%) found him guilty. Contingency table
and chi square analyses were completed for dichotomous demographic vari-
ables comparing the percentage of guilty and not guilty voting venire people
for each demographic variable. Data were collapsed so that each contin-
gency table was based on expected cell frequencies large enough to compute
reliable chi square statistics. In addition, t-tests were performed on all met-
ric variables comparing those participants who found the defendant not
guilty to those who found the defendant guilty.35 The results reported in Ta-
34. Sample sizes may vary slightly from analysis to analysis because of missing data.
35. The authors recognize that the most powerful analysis for the type of data collected
with the lowest probability of making a type I error is logistic regression analysis which
would have treated each item from the survey as a predictor and verdict-sentence categories
(not guilty of first degree murder, guilty with a life sentence, guilty with a death sentence) as
a criterion variable. Partly because of the small number of participants and the large number
of potential predictors (96 venire people answering 69 questions) and partly because several
of the predictors were composed of multiple levels (i.e., political ideology - Democrat, Re-
publican, & Independent) we decided that multivariate procedures were not feasible with this
1997]
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ble 1 show that those jurors who had a tendency to find the defendant not
guilty were likely to be highly educated, political independents (not Demo-
crats-very few of the respondents were Republicans) who were not op-
posed to drinking alcohol. They were more likely to agree that poor people
receive harsher criminal penalties than do people of average or higher in-
comes.
Table 1: First Degree Murder: Differences in Means and Percentages in
Venire People's Responses
Verdict
Not Guilty Guilty
Item Mean N Mean N t(df) P
Poor people receive
harsher penalties* 4.06 18 3.43 63 2.36 (79) .021
Highest grade of
education** 5.67 18 5.01 63 2.11 (79) .038
Answer
True (Yes) False (No)
NG (%) G (%) NG (%) G (%) Chsq. P N
Do you drink
alcohol? 15(29) 37(71) 3(10) 26(90) 3.69 .055 81
Are you a
Democrat*** 7(39) 11(61) 41(65) 22(35) 3.98 .046 81
Notes: * agreement ratings 1 = strongly disagree to 5 strongly agree;
** 5 = some college, 6 = college graduate; *** most of the no answers are
independents with few Republicans
data set. Instead we chose a series of univariate tests in which we admittedly increased the
likelihood of type I errors and minimized the likelihood of type Il errors. This approach pro-
vides the broadest array of potential verdict and sentence predictors possible. Items that were
correlated are retained in the prediction list and not eliminated by the statistical solution that
regression techniques use to solve multicolinearity problems. Eliminating some correlated
predictors through a multivariate analysis satisfies statistical requirements but may eliminate
the wrong correlate, that is, the factor that jurors actually focus on when making their deci-
sions. The rationale for choosing this approach was to identify as many potential factors as
possible that could be used by attorneys for making useful juror selections. We adopted this
approach in order to maximize the likelihood that the public defenders in study two would
select items that had some degree of empirical reliability. Further, even if the multivariate
approach would have been useable in study one it would not have been useable in study two,
in which we collected responses from only 18 public defenders. Comparison of results from
studies one and two would have been compromised had we employed a multivariate ap-
proach with the study one data and a univariate approach with the study two data. In these
and all analyses to follow, results are reported only for statistically significant relationships.
[Vol. 34
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Certainty ratings of those venire people finding the defendant not guilty
and those finding him guilty of first degree murder were analyzed with cor-
relations (see Table 2) and t-tests (see Table 3).
Table 2: Correlations Predicting Venire People's Certainty in Not Guilty
and Guilty Verdicts for First Degree Murder
Variable r N P
Not Guilty Voters - Correlations with Certainty
Criminals have too many rights -.60 16 .012
Police harassment is a serious problem -.52 16 .037
Dispensing just desserts is responsibility
of the criminal justice system -.49 16 .052
Age .57 16 .022
Guilty Voters - Correlations with Certainty
Punishments for crime -not severe enough .40 63 .001
Poor living conditions cause violence -.25 63 .052
Poor people receive harsher penalties -.26 63 .030
Note: All variables except for age are measured on a 1 = strongly disagree to 5
= strongly agree scale. Age is measured in years. Certainty is measured on a 1
= very uncertain to 5 = very certain scale.
1997]
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Table 3: Differences between Men and Women in Certainty for Not Guilty
and Guilty Verdicts for First Degree Murder
Men Women
Item Mean N Mean N t (dfl P
Not Guilty
Certainty 4.75 8 3.50 8 2.24 (14) .042
Guilty
Certainty 3.67 21 4.40 8 -2.00 (61) .050
Note: Certainty is measured on a 1 = very uncertain to 5 = very certain scale.
Results of these analyses show that venire people voting not guilty were
most certain in their decisions if they were older men, if they disagreed that
criminals already have too many rights in our society, if they disagreed that
police harassment is a serious problem, and if they disagreed that dispensing
just desserts is the responsibility of the criminal justice system. On the
other hand, those voting guilty were most certain in their decisions if they
were women, if they agreed that punishment for crime is not severe enough,
if they disagreed that poor living conditions cause violence, and if they
disagreed that poor people receive harsher penalties."
Sentencing. Of the sixty-two respondents who found the defendant
guilty of first degree murder and supplied a sentence, thirty-seven (60%)
imposed life imprisonment and twenty-five (40%) the death penalty. Once
again, contingency table and chi square analyses were completed for di-
chotomous demographic variables comparing the percentage of.life and
death sentencers for each level of each demographic variable. In addition, t-
tests were performed on all metric variables comparing those participants
who assigned life to those who imposed the death penalty.
36. All these relationships, except the negative correlation between certainty with a not
guilty verdict and disagreeing that police harassment is a serious problem, fit the direction
expected. It is possible that this relationship is simply the result of a chance event: a type I
error.
[Vol. 34
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Table 4: Predicting Life in Prison and Death Sentences:
Differences in Means and Percentages
Sentence
Prison Death
Item
Criminals have too
many rights
Punishments are not
severe enough
Welfare recipients
don't want to work
Mean N Mean N t (df)
3.45 37 4.08 25 2.71 (60) .009
3.68 37 4.28 25 2.89 (60) .005
2.29 37 2.92 25 2.27 (60) .027
Answer
True (Yes) False (No)
LF (%) D(%) LF (%) D (%) Chsq P N
Do you have
children? 23(52) 21(48) 14(78) 4 (22) 3.45 .063 62
Served on a
civil jury? 5(29) 12(71) 31(70) 13(30) 8.54 .003 62
Note: items in the first panel are measured with agreement ratings;
1= strongly disagree to 5 = strongly disagree
These results are reported in Table 4. Those jurors who found the de-
fendant guilty of first degree murder and who favored life imprisonment
were more likely to be without children and more likely not to have served
on a civil jury. They disagreed that criminals have too many rights, that
punishments for crime are not severe enough, and that welfare recipients do
not want to work.
One set of additional analyses was performed on the certainty ratings of
those venire people assigning life in prison and imposing the death penalty.
Responses were analyzed with correlations for metric variables and t-tests
(or oneway analysis of variance) for dichotomous variables. Results indi-
cated that participants who assigned life imprisonment were more certain of
their sentence assignments if they came from families with higher income
(r=.33, n = 37; p = .044) and agreed that punishments for crimes are not se-
vere enough (r = .44, n = 37, p = .007). More certain of their life imprison-
ment sentences were people who had served on a criminal jury (M = 4.58, n
19971
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= 12) as compared to those who had not done so (M = 3.76, n = 25, t(35) =
2.06; p = .047), as well as people who had never been married (M = 4.27, n
= 15), and those who were married (M = 4.50, n = 16) as compared to those
who were divorced (M = 2.17, n = 6, F(2,34) = 8.28, p = .001). For those
who assigned the death penalty, there were no significant correlations with
certainty of sentence and the only significant t-tests discriminating between
the groups had samples sizes so small as to make the statistics unreliable.'
Discussion
Results of the juror survey show some weak to strong predictors of ve-
nire people's verdict decisions. The demographic characteristics of people
who support a not guilty verdict or who were more certain of that verdict
were: higher education (moderate strength), alcohol consumption (weak),
lack of affiliation with the Democratic party (weak), older in years
(moderate), and male (weak). The attitude variables supporting a not guilty
verdict or certainty of that verdict were: agreement that poor people receive
harsher criminal penalties (moderate), disagreement that criminals have too
many rights (strong), disagreement that retribution is a primary responsibil-
ity of the criminal justice system (moderate), and disagreement that police
harassment is a serious problem (moderate).
We also found some weak to strong predictors of the sentencing deci-
sion. The demographic characteristics of those who favored life imprison-
ment or who were more certain of that sentence were: having no children
(weak), never having served on a civil jury (strong), higher income (weak),
having served on a criminal jury (weak), and never having been divorced
(strong). The attitude variables supporting a life in prison sentence or cer-
tainty of that sentence were: disagreement that criminals have too many
rights (strong), disagreement that punishments are not severe enough
(strong), and disagreement that welfare recipients do not want to work
(moderate). It should be noted that while viewing punishments as being se-
vere enough would seem to characterize not guilty voting jurors, those who
voted guilty and favored a life sentence were less certain of their sentences
if they agreed that criminal punishments were not severe enough. Thus, se-
lecting venire people who were of the opinion that punishments were severe
enough was a double edged sword. While those people might very well
have favored a not guilty verdict, they would have been more easily per-
suaded that life in prison was not the appropriate sentence, if despite their
own inclinations the jury returned a guilty verdict.
We presented our findings to the Public Defender's Office for use in
37. For all of these dichotomous membership variables, members of one of the demo-
graphic groups showed zero variance on ratings of certainty, making tests of significance
meaningless. The zero variance groupings were people who were union members, n = 5;
those who served in the armed forc~s, n = 4; those who admitted trying drugs, n = 7; and
those who had been witnesses at trial, n = 3.
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voir dire in the case of State v. Jones.3" The state used our results to help
select the Jones jury and to structure the arguments in the defense. Al-
though Jones was found guilty of first degree murder, he was sentenced to
life in prison without the possibility of probation or parole. 9 While we feel
confident that the public defender took seriously our recommendations, we
are unable to determine empirically, how much influence our data had on
the outcome of the case. Instead, we conducted a survey of other public de-
fenders unfamiliar with the case to determine the overlap between our sur-
vey results and their intuitive predictions of juror behavior.
STUDY 2
METHOD
Participants and Procedure
Twenty-five research packets were sent to a list of trial attorneys in the
Public Defender's Office who had experience trying first degree murder
cases, but who were not involved in the Jones defense. Eighteen (72%) at-
torneys completed the surveys and returned them to a liaison in the office.
The completed surveys were forwarded to our office with no identifying in-
formation.
Materials
The research materials we sent to the attorneys were similar to those we
administered to the venire people. We sent to each attorney the same case
summary that we administered to the venire panel participants along with a
follow-up questionnaire with sections that measured verdicts, sentences,
demographics, and general attitudes. However, the questionnaires were
modified to measure the attorneys' predictions about the way in which ju-
rors would respond to the case summary. First, the attorneys completed
each question three times, once as they predicted a typical not guilty-voting
juror would respond, once as a typical life sentence voting juror would re-
spond, and once as a typical death-imposing juror would respond." Second,
38. See supra note 31.
39. See State v. Jones, 919 S.W.2d 12, 13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
40. For example, consider the question, "What is your gender?" Public defenders were
asked to answer this question as they thought each of the juror types (not guilty voting jurors,
guilty voting death penalty-imposing jurors, and guilty voting life sentence-imposing jurors)
would answer. Of the 16 attorneys who answered this questions, 100% (n=16) thought the
typical death penalty voting juror would be male, 25% (n=4) thought the typical life sen-
tence-imposing juror would be male, and only 19% (n=3) thought that the typical not guilty
voting juror would be a man. Similarly, 16 public defender respondents supplied the ages of
the three types of jurors. The age of the typical death penalty-voting juror was 46 years, the
age of the typical life sentence imposer was 41, and the age of the typical not guilty voting
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the attorneys supplied estimates of the numbers of jurors they expected
would find the defendant not guilty, guilty with a life sentence, and guilty
with a death sentence. Some of the demographic questions were eliminated
from the attorney's survey to reduce the burden on the respondents and be-
cause it was unreasonable to expect accurate predictions.4' In all other ways
the survey was identical to the one used in Study 1.
Results and Discussion
The public defenders predicted that 10% of the death qualified venire
pool would find the defendant not guilty, 39% would find guilty and assign
life in prison, and 51% would find guilty and assign the death penalty. Juror
self-reports demonstrated a somewhat different split; eighteen (22%) not
guilty, thirty-seven (46%) guilty with life imprisonment, and twenty-five
(31%) guilty with the death penalty. Thus, the public defenders overesti-
mated the number of death imposing jurors. We analyzed the public de-
fenders' predictions of typical (not guilty, life, and death) juror responses to
each of the demographic and dichotomous variables with overall tests of
significance and follow-up post hoc procedures.
For some of the dichotomous demographic variables data were col-
lapsed into two category responses. For example, although the question,
"What is your marital status?" allowed three responses: married, single, and
divorced, we treated the answers supplied by the attorneys as either married
or single (few answered divorced for any of the three verdict predictions).
Three other questions were collapsed in this manner: religion (Catholic v.
not Catholic - mostly Protestant), race (white v. other), and political party
(Democrat v. not Democrat). We calculated the percent of public defenders
who answered in one direction (e.g., What is the juror's gender? - percent
male; Does the juror have children? - percent yes) and applied Cochran Q
tests42 (p < .05) to each variable to determine if these percentages were sig-
nificantly different across the verdict condition (not guilty, life imprison-
ment, death sentence). Finally we conducted follow-up McNemar, two
sample tests (p < .05) comparing each condition to the other two conditions,
but only for those variables that showed significant Cochran Q coefficients.
Listed in the top panel of Table 5 are all the dichotomous variables that the
attorneys predicted would differentiate between not guilty and either life
imprisonment or death penalty sentences.
juror was 38.
41. These items were: age of children, juror and spouse's occupation, law enforcement
officer, status of spouse, knowledge of people other than the juror who use illegal drugs, and
have you been a witness at trial.
42. The Cochran Q test is a multiple sample, repeated measure test of percentages analo-
gous to repeated measures analysis of variance. Unlike analysis of variance it does not make
parametric assumptions and is therefore appropriate for dichotomous data sets with small
sample sizes.
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Table 5: Demographic Factors Predicted by Attorneys
to Distinguish Among Sentencing Decisions
Characteristics of Jurors Voting Not Guilty
The juror has been accused of a crime.
The juror has not served on a civil jury.
The juror has not served on a criminal jury.
The juror has tried illegal drugs.
The juror is not a law enforcement officer.*
The juror does not own a business.*
The juror has no children.
The juror is a democrat.*
The juror is not white.
The juror is female.
The juror is not married.*
The juror is liberal.a
Characteristics of Jurors Imposing Life
The juror has not served on a criminal jury.
The juror is not a law enforcement officer.
The juror is not white.
The juror is liberal.
Notes: 1) All factors in the top panel except those marked with an as-
terisk were predicted to distinguish the not guilty jurors from the life
sentence and death penalty jurors. * Those marked with an asterisk
were only predicted to distinguish the not guilty from the death penalty
jurors. 2) "This factor was subjected to analysis of variance and all
comparisons between the types of jurors were significantly different. 3)
All factors in the bottom panel were predicted to discriminate between
life imprisonment and death penalty jurors.
The language used to list the attributes favors the not guilty decision.
Listed in the bottom panel are those factors that the attorneys predicted to
discriminate between life sentence and death penalty jurors. The language
used favors the life imprisonment sentence.
As Table 5 shows, the attorneys anticipated that many demographic
factors would differentiate between not guilty and guilty verdicts as com-
pared to life and death sentences. They predicted twelve demographic fac-
tors to separate the not guilty from the death imposing jurors and four of
these to separate the not guilty voting jurors from the life sentencers. On
the other hand, only four demographic factors were predicted to differenti-
ate between the life and death sentencers. These data suggest that public de-
fenders litigating murder cases may find it more difficult to select verdict-
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sympathetic than sentence sympathetic jurors. That is, to select verdict
sympathetic venire people the attorneys would need to evaluate a number of
attributes that they believed were important discriminators. On the other
hand these same public defenders would presumably rely on only four char-
acteristics (whether the juror had previously served on a criminal jury,
whether the juror was a law enforcement officer, race, and political ideol-
ogy) to discriminate between those who would vote for death and those for
life in prison. Although these data tell us very little about the validity of
attorney judgments, they do suggest that attorneys could make the latter
judgment with less effort than the former.
The attitude variables measured on a 1 (juror strongly disagrees) to 5
(juror strongly agrees) scale were analyzed with repeated measures analysis
of variance using the Huyn-Feldt adjustment for dependent degrees of free-
dom. Mean agreement ratings were calculated for each of the three juror
predictions and planned comparisons were conducted contrasting the not
guilty condition to the other two conditions (life imprisonment and death
sentence) and contrasting the two sentencing conditions with each other (life
imprisonment v. death). Results of this analysis are presented in Table 6
which lists the attitude variables that the attorneys predicted would differ-
entiate between the not guilty and the life sentence and death penalty jurors.
Also indicated are the jurors predicted to most strongly agree and disagree
with each statement.
The attorneys expected attitudes of jurors to be strong predictors of case
outcomes. Although our data do not directly test this hypothesis, the
stronger results in Table 6, as compared to those in Table 5, suggest that
public defenders would find it easier to select jurors on the basis of attitudes
than on demographic attributes and that they would be more certain of atti-
tude based judgments.
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Table 6: Attitudes Predicted by Attorneys to Distinguish
Among Sentencing Decisions
Criminals have too many rights.*
Punishments are not severe enough.*
Punishments deter future crime.*
Violence is caused by poor living conditions.
Gang violence results from racial injustice.
Punishment removes offenders from the street.*
Police harassment is a serious problem.
People on welfare don't want to work.*
Poor people receive harsher punishments.
The system should give criminals what they deserve.*
Blacks receive harsher criminal penalties.
Handguns should be controlled by federal law
A child's life is worth more than a dealer's life.*
Illegal drugs are the no. 1 U.S. problem.*
Notes: 1) Attorneys predicted those statements with asterisks to be
agreed upon by death penalty sentencing jurors and those without as-
terisks to be agreed upon by not guilty sentencing jurors. For all fac-
tors, agreement rates for life imprisonment sentencers were predicted to
lie in the middle of the other conditions. 2) Agreement rates predicted
for not guilty and guilty jurors (life imprisonment and death sentencers
combined) were significantly different for all attitudes and agreement
rates separating life and death jurors were significant for all attitudes
except "Punishment removes offenders from the streets" and 'Illegal
drugs are the no. 1 U.S. problem".
General Discussion
We return to the three general questions we asked about jury surveys
and attorneys' beliefs about juror behavior. First, by conducting an empiri-
cal survey in which we presented the facts of a case and attitude and demo-
graphic questionnaires to a sample of representative eligible jurors, we were
able to identify factors that correlated significantly with verdict decisions,
sentencing decisions, and certainty about those decisions. We used a repre-
sentative sample of venire people, presented the facts of an active case, and
were able to identify some moderate as well as relatively strong predictors
of initial juror positions. We expect that a jury selected by defense counsel
using the appropriate demographic and attitudinal characteristics would tend
to be pro-defense. While our results favor attitudes over demographic pre-
dictors as predictors of juror behavior, any mathematical or subjective for-
mula predicting juror outcome, similar to the ones discussed by Penrod and
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Cutler," would likely need to include some of each type of variable. Al-
though any attempt to suggest the effectiveness of such an equation in pre-
dicting actual verdicts and sentences in cases like the one we used can only
be based upon speculation, we suspect that in cases in which the fact pat-
terns match closely the prosecutions' theories of the offense, juror predispo-
sitions will be of limited value.' However, in other cases in which the facts
do not closely match the prosecutions' theories, juror attributes, attitudes
and beliefs may be useful in predicting outcomes. In any case, we think that
scientific or systematic jury selection can help an attorney eliminate jurors
who favor the opposition at the beginning of the trial. In trials with am-
biguous fact patterns, systematic jury selection may contribute meaningfully
to the outcome of litigation.
Second, analyses of public defenders' predictions of the responses of
typical not guilty voting jurors, life sentence imposing jurors, and death
sentence imposing jurors demonstrated that the attorneys hold many strong
expectations about the demographic and attitude attributes of jurors. In fact,
we found most of the questions that made up the questionnaire in some way
differentiated the attorneys' perceptions of typical not guilty, life, and
death-imposing jurors. Thirdly, the public defenders over-estimated the ab-
solute number of death sentencing jurors and they were too liberal in se-
lecting criteria to use in placing prospective venire people into each cate-
gory. Although these data strongly suggest that attorneys over-identify
factors to use in selecting a jury, it is possible that demand characteristics
offer another explanation for our results. It is possible that public defenders
assumed that the variables we asked about were important predictors simply
because we included them in the jury survey. In order to rule out this possi-
bility, additional data should be collected using different methodologies that
do not present specific demographic and attitudinal factors. Perhaps a fur-
ther study would allow attorneys the opportunity to identify predictors of
juror behavior in an open ended format. Nonetheless, the fact that our in-
strument was based, in large part, on a jury survey commonly employed by
the public defender's office reduces the meaningfulness of this demand
characteristic. The items on the survey were selected by attorneys them-
selves and not by researchers. Therefore, even if the items enjoyed a sali-
ence effect, they did so because public defenders commonly use them to as-
sist during voir dire.
Of course, we are unable to determine whether public defenders con-
ducting an actual voir dire would eliminate some of the factors that did not
differentiate among types of actual jurors. It is possible that when examin-
ing an actual venire panel, attorneys would change their expectations and
rely on a smaller number of criteria for juror selection. However, without
the assistance of a jury survey it is possible, indeed likely, that the attorneys
43. See Penrod & Cutler, supra note 23.
44. See Visher, supra note 22.
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would eliminate the wrong variables and would base their selections on
faulty assumptions. Our research suggests that the initial expectations of at
least our sample of public defenders were over-inclusive. For example, in
differentiating not guilty voting from guilty voting jurors, the public de-
fenders chose as significant demographic attributes a number of factors that
did not differentiate among the actual jurors' verdicts or correlate with cer-
tainty of their verdicts (e.g., marital status, political ideology, race, attitudes
toward blacks, attitudes toward handgun control, and attitudes toward illegal
drugs).
At the same time few, but some, of the attorneys' responses were un-
der-inclusive. For example, although jurors who were most likely to favor
life imprisonment over the death sentence had no children, this factor was
not used by the public defenders to discriminate between these groups.
Further, the status of parenthood distinguished between the not guilty and
guilty voting jurors, yet the attorneys did not recognize it as useful in sepa-
rating life imprisonment from death sentencing jurors.
In a frequently cited study, Zeisel and Diamond examined voir dire
success rate in a small sample of cases. 5 Although defense attorneys were
slightly more successful than prosecuting attorneys, neither group demon-
strated more than minimal success at eliminating unsympathetic jurors, and
both types of lawyers show high degrees of variability from trial to trial in
successful voir dire. Our data did not test the overall effectiveness of juror
surveys for improving jury selection.4' Nonetheless, our data suggest that
one factor which may limit the success of attorneys in voir dire is the
largely over-inclusive nature of attorney expectations of juror behavior.
Perhaps the most significant contribution that juror surveys may make to
voir dire is to reduce the number of criteria available in memory to attor-
neys when forming peremptory challenges. Armed with the results of such
surveys, attorneys may be more able to detect true juror bias7 and avoid
over interpreting juror attributes. We conclude that a survey presenting the
facts and law of an active case to a representative sample of eligible jurors
can help attorneys to select criteria most likely to discriminate between hos-
tile and sympathetic jurors.
45. See H. Zeisel & S.S. Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and
Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491 (1978).
46. See Cutler, supra note 3; Fulero & Penrod, supra note 3; Hans, supra note 7.
47. See Begam, supra note 1.
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